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2
Introduction
Understanding the mechanisms behind the evolution of unemployment is important
in order to react better and more accurately to changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. So far, many studies have been performed aiming at dening factors which
are closely linked to unemployment. I therefore decided to give an overview of those
economic inuences a¤ecting the course of unemployment. But the motivation of this
paper is not only to focus on the theoretical approach but also to assess if the results
of those theories and models are supported by economic data.
Econometric studies rst focused on the impact of economic shock in order to explain
the general increase in European unemployment, which started in the 60s. Three main
shocks could be observed. The rst was a decrease in the total factor productivity
growth since the 60s, the growth rate dropped from about 6% to 2% in the 90s. After
the post World War II years, European economies experienced an economic catch up
with high TFP-growth rates, in order to gain competitiveness in the world market. In
the 60s this catch-up e¤ect went away and the economies slowed down. The second
massive shock was a decline in the labour share starting at the end of the 70s. This
evolution can be explained in part by an increase in real wages. The evolution of the
interest rates is the last inuencing shock. As a reaction to the oil shock, central banks
decreased interest rates in the 70s. The following decades were characterized by a
continuous increase in interest rates.
With shocks one can explain the general trend of unemployment but not the dif-
ferences across countries. In order to answer the question why the same shocks a¤ect
countries in di¤erent ways, economists turned their attention to labour market institu-
tions. Such institutions like employment protection legislation, unions or social benets
a¤ect labour market performance and the impact of a shock. Later on we will see that
some institutions may cause more labour market rigidity, which can hinder the labour
market from adjusting to shocks. The rst section of this paper will cover those issues
and summarize the theories brought up in the paper The Role of Shocks and Institution
in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence(2000), by Olivier
Blanchard and Justin Wolfers as well as those in the OECD Paper "Employment Pat-
terns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions" (2006),
by Andrea Bassani and Romain Duval. The regressions performed in this section show
that institutions as well as shocks can account for a great part of the evolution of
unemployment, supporting in part the ndings of the papers mentioned above.
The next approach to better understand the evolution of unemployment is to look
at the degree of product market regulation. In most European countries many sectors,
such as the energy or transportation industries are still highly regulated. I will present
the model and ndings of Olivier Blanchards and Francesco Giavazzis paper Macro-
economic E¤ects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labour Markets(2003).
Their model assumes that labour market deregulation can be done through a decrease
in the bargaining power of workers. This can for example happen if the government
reduces the strictness of the conditions for layo¤s. Product markets can be deregulated
by lowering the barriers to entry which allows more rms to start their businesses. The
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idea behind their research is to show the short and long run e¤ects of deregulation on
the unemployment rate. In order to analyze and determine whether these mechanisms
are supported by the data, I performed estimations including a variable measuring the
degree of product market regulation.
The last section of this paper analyses the impact of labour relations on the level of
unemployment. In order to study this issue, I used the model from the paper The Qual-
ity of Labour Relations and Unemployment(2006) by Olivier Blanchard and Thomas
Philippon. It is basically a search matching model, where rms post vacancies and
workers apply. An extension to this standard model is the assumption of asymmetric
information and the fact that rms can have a good or a bad reputation, meaning that
they can lie about their productivity in order to reap higher rents. The model intro-
duces also another shock, namely the increase in rm level uncertainty, which could
explain unemployment evolutions. The estimations I will present in this section nd
only little support for this theory.
1 The E¤ects of Institutions and Shocks on Unemployment
From the 60s to the 90s the overall unemployment rate in the OECD countries increased
by about 9%, but not all countries were hit the same way: while for example Switzerland
had an unemployment rate of only 4.1% in the 90s, Spain had more than 20%. One
way to explain this rise is by shocks a¤ecting the economies. The increase of the oil
price and the decrease in total factor productivity growth are two shocks which have
a¤ected the evolution of the unemployment rate. The question is: why did those shocks
not a¤ect all countries in the same way? The answer is that countries have di¤erent
labour market institutions. One may have a decentralized, another a centralized wage
bargaining system. Some have high other low replacement rates. The consequence is
that shocks can have more or less strong e¤ects on the economy.
We now have two explanations for the evolution of unemployment: the rst are
shocks, which can explain the general increase in unemployment since the 60s, but not
the di¤erences across countries; the second are labour market institutions which can
explain todays di¤erences across countries.
In their paper from 2000 Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers studied the evolution
of unemployment since the 60s in European countries. They had a data set including
variables describing institutions and shocks in 20 OECD countries. Their main nding
was that the interaction between shocks and institutions can account for the evolution
of European unemployment. This conclusion is based on estimations including labour
market institutions and macroeconomic shocks.
This section of the paper is intended to explain the e¤ects of the labour market
institutions and shocks on the unemployment rate. In order to do so, I will in a rst step
concentrate on institutions, and explain the mechanisms behind those institutions. This
is important for understanding how institutions can worsen or improve the performance
of labour markets. In a second step I will introduce shocks in order see if they bring
further information into the regressions.
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1.1 Institutions
Blanchard and Wolfers found institutions to play an important role in explaining the
behavior of unemployment in European countries. In order to see if I can support their
ndings I rst have estimated the unemployment rate with 6 institutions. However
there is one problem which arises when using labour market institution for explaining
unemployment. Most of those institutions have an endogeneity problem, which means
that they are in part inuenced by the unemployment rate. This is problematic, be-
cause our estimators risk to be biased. Lets take one simple example, namely the
benet system. Di Tella and MacCulloch1 show in their paper that countries where
unemployment increased the most after the oil shocks in the 70s were also countries
where the benet system became more generous afterwards. Furthermore they have
shown that the largest increases were detected in countries having very low benets.
This implies that if an adverse shock happens to a country with low benet rates, the
government may be forced to increase those rates to keep demand at a certain level. If
a larger part of the population lived at the subsistence level, consumption would drop
dramatically and the economy would perform even worse. To address this problem,
one could use instrumental variables, like lagged values, but since I did not have such
instruments, this hitch remains untreated in my paper. Being aware of this issue, one
should be cautious when interpreting the results of the following estimations.
I used the dataset from the paper by Andrea Bassani and Romain Duval published
in June 2006. This dataset contains measures of political institutions and economic
determinants2 from 20 OECD countries, covering 21 years (from 1982 to 2003). As we
will see later, Blanchard and Wolfers used xed variables for describing institutions,
while the variables used in this paper are time-variant. Why this assumption leads to
a di¤erent outcome will be explained in the econometric part of this section. In this
subsection I will dene the variables I used for this rst regression and explain their
impacts on the evolution of unemployment. I also will present the ndings of those
estimations and check whether the results conform with the theory.
1.1.1 The Average Replacement Rate and Unemployment Benet Dura-
tion
The benet system was found to have a great impact on the evolution of unemployment.
Unfortunately only variables measuring the average replacement rate and the duration
index are available in form of time series. In order to analyze the benet system it would
also be of interest to look at the coverage and the strictness of the system. Especially
the latter could explain why some countries, which have a generous benet system
have very low unemployment rates. By increasing the strictness through tightening the
criteria for receiving benets and enforcing those criteria through a system of sanctions
the negative e¤ects of generous benets, which we will be explained subsequently, can
1"Unemployment Shocks and Labor Market Institutions" by R. Tella and R. MacCulloch", June
1999
2Institutions were chose according to the availability of data. Only variables for which there existed
data over the whole periode from 1982 to 2003 were included in the regressions.
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be avoided.
The replacement rate represents the percentage of the former income which the
average unemployed receives. When creating this rate two di¤erent family and employ-
ment situation as well as three unemployment durations were averaged. The measure
of benet duration is created by dividing the average replacement rate by the initial
replacement rate, which is given by the benets received in the rst year of unemploy-
ment. The form of this index implies that if it tends to 1, the benets are distributed
more equally between the ve years where the unemployed receives them. If on the
other hand the index tends to 0, it is likely that unemployed receive higher benets at
the beginning and in the following year much less. A generous unemployment insurance
system has negative e¤ects on unemployment3. It can increase the unemployment rate
and duration. If unemployed individuals get a high replacement rate for a long time
the incentive to search for a job, and therefore the search intensity might decrease.
Another e¤ect can be that they accept less job o¤ers and ask for higher wages. If the
employer does not accept the wage claim, the worker just looks out for another job. In
other words, the number of separations increases: the inow into the unemployment
pool increases while the outow decreases, which obviously leads to a rise in the un-
employment rate. The cost, additional unemployed bring to the government could lead
to a further increase in unemployment, since those payments have to be nanced by
higher taxes, which can also have a negative impact on unemployment. Unemployment
benets are necessary in order to assure certain living and social standards after the
loss of a job. From this point of view, higher benets can also have positive e¤ects on
unemployment, namely a lower separation rate. The explanation is that workers can
take more time to nd a match. An unemployed who is not under pressure may be able
to nd a job which complies to his abilities. If a person rushes into the job search and
takes the rst o¤er he gets, the probability of a separation is surely higher than if he
can take his time and has more job interviews.
1.1.2 Union Density and Degree of Corporatism
The degree of centralization is measured by a dummy variable, which can take the value
1, for very centralized or the value 0 for decentralized systems. A more centralized
wage bargaining system can have positive e¤ects on employment levels. This can be
explained by the fact that if wages are determined by unions in a more centralized way,
those are more aware of the macroeconomic e¤ects excessive wage claims can have on
employment. They therefore restrain those wage demands such employment levels do
not drop. On the other hand if unions bargain decentralized in each rm, those negative
externalities from high wage claims are not considered, since their horizon is restricted
to the rm level.
The union density measures the percentage of workers being members of a trade
union. The countries with the lowest union density, namely less than 20% are Spain,
France, the USA and Japan. On the other hand countries with a traditionally high
union density are the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. In some countries like
3A negative impact on the unemployment rate always refers to an increase in unemployment.
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New Zealand, Portugal or Ireland the proportion of workers being members in a union
decreased dramatically in the past decades. However the union density variable only
shows the percentage of the workers who are a¢ liated to a union but doesnt tell us
anything about the union coverage. In some countries only few worker participate in
the unions, but most of the population is covered by a collective agreement. This is
the case for example in Spain and France where the union coverage is high while only
few workers are members of trade unions. In literature union density has no explicit
inuence on the unemployment rate. The crucial question is how unions act. Do they
claim high wages? Do they bargain at the rm level or in a more centralized way? In
countries where the union density is high but the bargaining takes place at the rm level
(decentralized bargaining), the outcome may have negative e¤ects on unemployment, as
already explained above. While countries with centralized bargaining may prot from
a high union density. Another inuencing factor is the power of unions. Even if the
union density in one country is high, the e¤ects on unemployment may be insignicant
if the unions dont have enough inuence.
1.1.3 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
This variable measures the stringency of employment protection. The index goes from
0 (very exible labour market legislation ) to 6 (very strict labour market legislation).
One cannot clearly say if strict EPL increases or decreases unemployment. The the-
ory assumes an intertemporal trade o¤ of labour market deregulation. One means of
deregulation is to reduce the bargaining power of workers. Since the rent of the rm is
shared between workers and rm, a decrease in the bargaining power of workers leads
to a lower share for workers, and therefore lower wages. In the short run, rms prot
from labour market deregulation, they get higher rents, while workers lose. Employ-
ment e¤ects though only occur in the long run: Firms are attracted by high rents they
now can earn, but it takes some time to enter the market. Firms spot this possibility
and enter the market in the long run. This increase in competition leads to a fall in
prices and therefore an increase in real wages (leading back to the pre-deregulation
wage level) while the employment levels increase, since new rms post vacancies. The
long run e¤ect therefore is a decrease in unemployment and wages return to the same
level, after having temporary decreased. The model for labour market deregulation will
be explained later on in Section 2 of this paper. Another way to look at the e¤ects
of EPL is to say that with strict EPL, it becomes more di¢ cult or costly for rms
to re workers. Therefore rms will be more cautious when hiring, since they cannot
easily "get rid" of workers if they dont fulll their duties as expected and consequently
less workers are dismissed. On the other hand the hiring rates also decrease, meaning
that less unemployed nd a job and it becomes more di¢ cult to get out of the pool of
unemployed. In order to know if strict EPL will increase or decrease unemployment
one has to know which of those two e¤ects will prevail. The econometric ndings until
now could neither nd signicant results in favor nor against strict EPL.
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1.1.4 Tax Wedge
The tax wedge measures how costly it is in terms of taxes for an employer to hire. That
is, the wedge between the labour cost of the employer and the amount of disposable
income a worker receives. In short, how much weight the income tax and all social
security contributions have relative to the total labour cost. In most European countries
the tax wedge ranges between 25% and 45%. The lowest levels can be attributed to
the Anglo-Saxon countries and Switzerland which have numbers around 15%. Italy,
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries (with the exception
of Norway) have the highest values at about 40%. The theory predicts that a higher tax
wedge has a negative impact on unemployment in the short run. This reects the fact
that if labour becomes expensive for the employer, meaning that the amount of taxes he
has to pay for each worker increases, he may hire less workers, consequently the number
of vacancies falls and the labour market becomes tighter for unemployed. If however
there are less vacancies per unemployed the wage levels are negatively a¤ected. Because
of inows into the pool of unemployed competition between job-seekers increase and
workers lose bargaining power. This decrease in wages can lead in turn to an increase in
postings of vacancies and to higher employment rates in the long run. It is also argued in
the literature4 that in countries with a low degree of wage coordination the impact of the
tax wedge on unemployment is stronger. When labour taxes increase, the cost of labour
for rms increases. In order to keep the labour cost at the same level, the consumption
wage of workers needs to decrease such that the tax-increase is compensated. Unions,
which bargain at a centralized level will take potential negative employment e¤ect more
into account and push wages less, as already seen before. Consequently labour costs for
rms increase less dramatically and the rise in unemployment will be softened. However
in the theory the long run e¤ects of tax wedges on the unemployment rate are unclear.
1.1.5 Econometric Findings
 Estimations Method and Data Issues:
The institutional variables used by Blanchard and Wolfers were time-invariant.
Their assumption was that changes in institutions on their own cannot explain the
cross-country variation over time of unemployment changes. They argue that those
institutions existed already before European unemployment began to increase and can
therefore not explain this evolution. In the next two sub-sections we will use a set of
time-variant institutions and shocks in order to show that contrary to the ndings of
Blanchard and Wolfers, institutions can account for a large part of those variations,
supporting the ndings of Bassani and Duval (2006).
Since there are unobserved e¤ects in the data, the estimation model should control
for them. In this case the two-way xed e¤ects method is appropriate, in order to
control for the omitted variable problem. This estimation method allows to control for
unknown time- and country-specic e¤ects. The xed e¤ects model assumes that the
4As demonstrated in the paper "Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries"
(1997) by F. Daveri and G. Tabellini
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unobserved e¤ects are correlated with the explanatory variables5. We can imagine the
general attitude of a countrys government towards unions as such an e¤ect. Another
example of an omitted variable would be the political attitude in a country. The
decisions the government takes, depend on the approach to social security or economics
in general and clearly a¤ect employment legislation, the tax wedge etc. Because of this
correlation it is better to use the xed rather than the random e¤ects model. In order
to conrm econometrically that the xed e¤ects model ts our data best we have to
perform a Hausmann specication test. In our case we can reject the null-hypothesis,
which says that the coe¢ cients of the e¢ cient random e¤ects estimator are the same
as the ones of the consistent xed e¤ects estimator, conrming that we should choose
the xed over the random e¤ects model (results not reported).
The two-way xed e¤ect model creates dummy variables for each year and country,
which allows for separate intercepts or constants for every group and time period. This
means that we can take into account not only the individual e¤ects but also the e¤ect
of each period inside the estimation. To prove that the time and country dummies
are jointly signicant and therefore should remain in the model, we perform an F-test
(results not reported). The results conrm that both time and country dummies are
jointly signicant. The model calculates for each observation the deviation from the
group mean. That way it is possible to see the average e¤ect of each variable. The
intuition behind this model is to have the unobserved e¤ects in the coe¢ cients and not
in the error term, which would cause biased estimators.
In the following estimations I excluded the observations for the years 1990 and 1991
for Germany, Finland and Sweden, because of historical events, especially the collapse
of the Soviet Union, which led to a sudden increase in unemployment in Germany. In
Finland and Sweden the unemployment rate increased in the early 90s by about 8%.
The countries encountered a severe economic and banking crisis with a harsh decline
in GDP and an increase in unemployment. This important increase in unemployment
cannot be explained by changes in institutions or economic shocks, therefore those three
countries have to be split up in post and pre 90/91 in order to prevent an estimate bias.
 Estimation with Institutions:
For the rst estimation (Table 1, column 1-4) I used the following model:
uit =
X
j
jX
j
it + i + t + "it
This expression gives us the unemployment rate of country i in period t. It depends
on the explanatory variables Xj, which are the di¤erent institutions mentioned in the
previous section, i and t which are the country and time xed e¤ects and nally the
error term "it.
5One restriction of this model is that the explanatory variables have to vary over time. If they
were time-invariant, it would be impossible to distinguish between the e¤ect of the observable and the
unobservable variables
7
Table 1
Unemployment Estimations with Institutions (xed e¤ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coe¢ cient (t-statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-statistic)
Replacem ent Rate 0.17 (7.59) 0.14 (5.34) 0.16 (7.47) -
Tax Wedge 0.33 (10.76) - 0 .34 (11.30) 0.29 (9.24)
Union Density 0.03 (1.22) 0.04 (1.80) - -0 .01 (-0 .66)
H igh Corp oratism -1.54 (-3 .30) - - -0 .72 (-1 .50)
EPL 0.46 (1.13) 0.57 (1.21) 0.27 (0.69) -0 .60 (-1 .47)
Benet Duration -2 .57 (-2 .92) -3 .28 (-2 .93) -2 .80 (-3 .00) -0 .84 (-0 .86)
Uniondens*h ighcorp - - -0 .03 (-3 .45) -
Tw*Lowcorp - 0 .05 (2.87) - -
R2 (w ith in) 0.50
R2 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.85
Country and T im e Dumm ies yes yes yes yes
Observations 434 434 434 440
The results of the rst estimation are depicted in column (1) of Table 1. All
coe¢ cients are signicant at a 5% level (critical value of the t-statistic is 1.96), except
EPL and union density, which goes along with the theory. The signs of the coe¢ cients
are as expected: Replacement rate, tax wedge, EPL, and union density have positive
signs, meaning that an increase of those variables induces an increase in unemployment,
while the level of corporatism has a negative sign, implying that unemployment rate
drops if this variable increases.
How can we explain the negative and signicant coe¢ cient of benet duration?
As we saw earlier a possible explanation for a positive e¤ect on unemployment would
be that people receiving benets for a long period are not under time-pressure when
searching for a job. This can lower separation rates and consequently lead to lower
unemployment rates. In column (1) the negative e¤ect of high replacement rates is
captured by the coe¢ cient of the average replacement rate, while the positive e¤ect is
captured by the coe¢ cient of benet duration. In column (4) I dropped the replacement
rate, which led to an insignicant coe¢ cient for the benet duration and the measure
for corporatism.
In order to analyze the e¤ect of the tax wedge I constructed the variable Tw*Lowcorp,
which measures the e¤ect of the tax wedge together with a low degree of corporatism.
As we can see in column (2) of Table 1 the coe¢ cient turns out to be positive and
signicant, suggesting a negative impact on the unemployment rate. The explanation
behind this result is that unions in countries where bargaining takes place at rm level
tend to claim higher wages. Firms begin to switch to less labour intensive productions
and lower employment levels, which can lead to an increase unemployment.
As we can see from column (1) union density is statistically insignicant. Since
union density is closely linked to the degree of corporatism I constructed an interaction
variable, namely uniondens*highcorp, measuring the cumulative e¤ects of those two
8
variables. In column (3) we can see that the coe¢ cient is negative and signicant,
implying that a high union density together with a centralized bargaining system has
a positive impact on unemployment.
 Estimation with Institutions and Output Gap:
In the second estimation I introduced the output gap as a new variable. It repre-
sents the percentage di¤erence between actual and long-run trend output of a country.
Through the output gap we can control for the uctuations in unemployment over busi-
ness cycles. Its like assuming that countries are hit by the same unobservable shock.
However the interpretation of the output gap is not straightforward because of the close
link to unemployment. The output gap is likely to be inuenced by the unemployment
rate which causes an endogeneity problem. The unemployment rate in this estimation
is given by
uit =
X
j
jX
j
it + Git + i + t + "it
, where Git is the output gap of country i in period j. The rest of the variables are
the same as in the previous estimation.
Table 2
Unemployment Estimation with Institutions
and Output Gap (xed e¤ects)
Coe¢ cient (t-statistic)
Replacem ent Rate 0.15 (8.46)
Tax Wedge 0.28 (11.41)
Union Density -0 .02 (-1 .45)
H igh Corp oratism -0.91 (-2 .24)
EPL 0.40 (1.24)
Benet Duration -2 .62 (-3 .5)
Output Gap -0.49 (-14.99)
R2 (w ith in) 0.69
R2 0.92
Country and T im e Dumm ies yes
Observations 434
Table 2 represents the results of estimation 5. The output gap is highly signicant
and its coe¢ cient has a negative sign. This means that countries with a higher output
gap tend to have lower unemployment rates. Since the output gap represents the
deviation of actual from long-run trend output (y y) a positive output gap means that
the economy is in a "boom period" while a negative output gap would imply a recession.
Therefore the negative sign of the coe¢ cient conforms with the theory. In other words,
if y  y the output gap is positive and the economy is in a "good" period, implying
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a lower unemployment rate. The R2 improves from 0.87 to 0.92, meaning that the
output gap adds further information to the regression leading to a higher explanatory
potential. Those results suggest that if for example a country reduces unemployment
benets by 10%, the unemployment rate decreases by 1.5%. A drop of 10% in the tax
wedge would lead to a decrease in unemployment of 2.8%. In this regression 69% of
the di¤erences in changes in unemployment from 1982 to 2003 within countries can be
explained by changes in institutions and the output gap, which is much better, than
the result for the estimations without output gap. Since the output gap indicates if a
country is in a cyclical up- or downturn this result would imply that many countries in
this sample were in di¤erent economic periods, meaning that their business cycles were
not synchronized.
Figure 1
Observed vs. Predicted Change in Unemployment from 1990 to 2003
(Institutions and Output Gap)
(Graph: Germany, Finland and Sweden: 1989 to 2003)
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Observed Unemployment Change
Figure 1 depicts the actual and predicted change in unemployment from 1990 to
2003. As on can see, the t is quite well for most countries of the sample. However there
are some outlier, like for example Spain or Italy, where the decrease in unemployment
was estimated much lower than it actually was. The graph shows that the estimation
slightly underestimates the changes in unemployment.
We turn now to the robustness of those results. I rst introduced each institution
individually in order to see if they still are signicant. The results are depicted in
column (1) of Table 3. All variables, except EPL and union density turn out to be
signicant. The results (not reported) are also robust if dropping one institution at a
time. In column (2) of Table 3 we can see that if we perform the estimation without
country e¤ects, that is we assume that all variations in unemployment can be explained
by di¤erences in institutions, the results remain generally signicant. Without country
10
e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of union density becomes signicant and negative. The coe¢ cient
of benet duration becomes positive and EPL turns out to be signicant. In a last step
we look what happens to our results if we drop one country at a time. This test shows
that in general the results are robust to such changes, the coe¢ cients remain signicant.
The exceptions are Norway, where the coe¢ cient for union density becomes signicant,
and New Zealand, where the coe¢ cient of high corporatism turns out to be insignicant.
Table 3
Robustness Check
(1) Entered Ind iv idually (2) No Country E¤ects
Replacem ent Rate 0.06 (2,95) 0.05 (3.01)
Tax Wedge 0.31 (9.90) 0.20 (8.45)
Union Density 0.006 (0.29) -0 .05 (-6 .14)
H igh Corp oratism -1.41 (-3 .25) -2 .37 (-6 .74)
EPL -0.16 (-0 .38) -0 .44 (-2 .38)
Benet Duration -2 .69 (-2 .78) 2.42 (3.23)
Output Gap -0.55 (-14.21) -0 .69 (-9 .22)
R2 - 0 .47
Country and T im e Dumm ies Yes No Country Dumm ies
1.2 Shocks and their Interaction with Institutions
Three major shocks happened since the 60s. The rst one is the decline in total factor
productivity growth. This shock a¤ected all European countries quite equally. This
decline should have a¤ected the wage level negatively, but in the 60s and 70 workers
increased their bargaining power and claimed higher wage. The result was an increase
in the equilibrium unemployment rate and the expectations of unemployment. But
this e¤ect is not a permanent one, it can account for the increase in unemployment
in the 70s, but not for the persistence of this phenomenon. After the decline in TFP
growth unemployment increased, but after wages and expectations had adjusted those
negative e¤ects should have gone away. Unemployment continued to rise suggesting
that something else must have happened.
This something were in a rst instance the changes in the real interest rate. In most
countries they turned negative or decreased in the mid 70s but increased afterwards.
The sharp decrease can be interpreted as a reaction to the oil shock and the decrease
in TFP growth in the 70s. In order to stimulate investment and consumption, interest
rates were held low, sometimes they were even negative. This a¤ects the behavior of
rms, which will increase labour demand. In the 70s they invested more and labour
demand increased, while it was the other way round in the 80s.
The last shock is the shift in labour demand. In the mid 70s the labour share
went sharply down, after having increased in the previous years. This increase can be
explained by the high labour costs, caused by high wage growth together with low TFP
growth. The rst consequence was that the share of labour in the production process
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increased in the short run, while in the long run rms decreased labour demand. This
second e¤ect can be explained by the fact that the elasticity of substitution is less than
one in the short run, and rms therefore react only in the long run to higher labour
costs by reducing labour demand. This explains why labour share only decreased at
the end of the 70s, while TFP growth had already begun to decrease in the 60s. This
adverse labour demand shock led to a decrease in employment levels and to an increase
in unemployment. Firms introduced new, more productive production technologies,
using less labour, which could in time lead to higher prots and consequently more
investment. In the long run rms hire new workers and unemployment decreases. This
shock could explain the high unemployment rates in the 90s, but would also mean that
unemployment should begin to decrease at the beginning of the 21st century, which has
happened.
Another factor which had inuenced the evolution of unemployment is ination. In
Europe, where the ination is on average at a low or medium level, it increased in the
70s and decreased afterwards. This means that up to the 70s the actual unemployment
was below the equilibrium rate, while since the 70s the actual unemployment has been
above the equilibrium rate. The expansionary monetary policy in the 60s softened
the negative e¤ects of the decline in TFP growth and the oil shock. In the 70s the
policy changed and ination was kept low while interest rates were high leading to
higher unemployment in the 80s. The labour demand shock can nally account for the
increase in unemployment in the 90s.
Now that we have dened the major shocks, we should concentrate on their interac-
tion with institutions. Shocks happen quite equally in all European countries, but their
e¤ects can be more or less important and persistent, depending on the labour market
institutions of the countries. An adverse shock causing a productivity slowdown might
have less severe e¤ects in a country, where wages are bargained at the national level,
as we saw before.
Some institutions can a¤ect the persistence of unemployment. If an adverse labour
demand shock happens, the unemployment rate increases, there are more workers
searching for a job and wages should therefore decrease. This happens because the
competition between unemployed increases and employers have more job applicants
per vacancy. Lower wages will then lead to higher employment rates, because labour
becomes cheaper for rms, and the unemployment rate decreases. If this mechanism
is distorted by strict employment protections, a¤ecting the wage determination, wages
cannot decrease and unemployment remains high. Another reason for the persistence
of unemployment is the increase in the duration of unemployment. If unemployment
increases, the duration typically increases too. This means that there are more long
term unemployed. The problem which arises now is that, the longer a person stays
unemployed, the more skills he loses and the lower is his search intensity. Firms may
not hire long term unemployed people because they might not have the same produc-
tivity as someone who only stayed one month unemployed. This causes the long term
unemployed to search even less for a job. As a consequence they drop more or less out
of the labour market, meaning that they dont search anymore for a job, and do no
12
longer compete with other job-seekers. But the competition between unemployed was
the mechanism which caused this downward pressure on wages.
Since labour market institutions a¤ect the unemployment duration, they also a¤ect
the persistence of unemployment. As we saw already, generous replacement rates for
example, can lead to lower search intensities of unemployed leading to less matches
and higher unemployment. When unemployment increases due to an adverse shock a
high minimum wage will have e¤ects on the unemployment rate of the less educated
workers by reducing the downward pressure on the wages. Since recipients of the
minimum wage are mostly workers with poor education, they will su¤er most from
an increase in unemployment. Normally their wages should decrease (because of the
downward pressure due to more competition in job-search), but they cannot fall below
the minimum wage. The consequence is that rms will rst re people with poor
education, since they cannot adjust wages.
Another way of explaining persistent high unemployment even after the e¤ects of
adverse shocks have disappeared already is by looking at how people perceive unem-
ployment. In countries with typically low unemployment, being unemployed may have
a low reputation, and people may therefore have a higher incentive to nd a job. If now
unemployment increases and becomes persistent, this opinion might change and people
may not be stigmatized any more because of being unemployed, which could lead to
lower search intensities and higher long term unemployment.
1.2.1 Econometric Findings
 Estimation with Institutions and Shocks:
Now that we have outlined the three important shocks which a¤ected the economy
since the 60s, we can introduce them in the regression. I replaced the output gap,
used in the previous estimations by three shock variables: The rst is measuring the
deviation of the logarithm of TFP from its trend (in %). The second is the percentage
di¤erence between the 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and the annual
change in the GDP deator (in %) and is a measure for the real interest rate shock. The
last one represents the logarithm of the labour share in business sector GDP purged
from the short-run inuences of factor prices. Since the variable was multiplied by -1
an increase refers to an adverse labour demand shock and a decrease in labour demand.
The variable is set to 0 in 1970 (the rst year of data availability).
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Table 4
Unemployment Estimation with Shocks only
(xed e¤ects)
Coe¢ cient (t-statistic)
TFP Shock -10.61 (-2 .43)
Real Interest Rate Shock 0.29 (5.56)
Labour Demand Shock 7.82 (2.38)
R2 (w ith in) 0.35
R2 0.86
Country and T im e Dumm ies yes
Observations 394
When estimating the shocks without institutions, all coe¢ cients have the expected
sign and are signicant. The results are depicted in Table 4. A negative value for TFP-
shock variable would mean that TFP growth lies under the long run trend, implying
a lower economic growth. This would lead to an increase in unemployment, since the
coe¢ cient has a negative sign. If on the other hand TFP growth lies above the long
run trend unemployment is lower.
An adverse real interest rate shock would mean that interest rates highly increase,
leading to a fall of investment and to lower employment rates. Therefore the impact on
the unemployment rate is negative.
An increase in the measure of labour demand can be interpreted as an adverse
shock. This follows from denition of the variable:   [log (N=Y ) + log (Wadjusted)] :The
variable increases if the inside of the brackets becomes negative, which is only the case
if the labour demand stock falls. We can interpret a 4% decrease in TFP growth as
an increase of 0.4% in unemployment when all other shocks are held constant. A 15%
decrease in labour demand would lead to a to an increase of 1.3% in unemployment. In
Table 5 we nd the results of the regression combining shocks and institutions:
Table 5
Unemployment Estimation with Institutions
and Shocks (xed e¤ects)
Coe¢ cient (t-statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-statistic)
Replacem ent Rate 0.14 (5.75) TFP Shock -9 .42 (-2 .37)
Tax Wedge 0.27 (7.76) Real Interest Rate Shock 0.20 (3.99)
Union Density 0.05 (2.17) Labour Demand Shock 9.04 (2.82)
Corp oratism -1.20 (-2 .58)
EPL 0.54 (1.27)
Benet Duration -2 .23 (-2 .46)
R2 (w ith in) 0.48
R2 0.89
Country and T im e Dumm ies yes
Observations 394
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If we compare the results of Table 5 to those of Table 3, we can see that the coef-
cients of the replacement rate, the tax wedge and benet duration are less signicant
than in this second estimation, while union density and high corporatism gains signif-
icance. Figure 2 plots the actual and the predicted change in unemployment for the
countries in the sample.
Figure 2
Observed vs. Predicted Change in Unemployment
from 1990 to 2003 (Institutions and Shocks)
(Germany, Finland and Sweden: 1989 to 2003)6
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Observed Unemployment Change
The t has worsened compared to the estimation without shocks. Especially for
Ireland the prediction has become much weaker. In Ireland there happened a major
turnaround beginning in 1993, where unemployment decreased dramatically from over
15% to less than 5% in 2000, making an accurate prediction di¢ cult. The overall
decrease from 1990 to 2003 was 8%, unfortunately largely underestimated by the model,
which predicted a decrease of only about 3%. In the 90s Ireland had extraordinary
growth rates of about 5%, which led to a massive increase in employment, especially
in new sectors, like electronics. Additionally the Irish government reformed the tax
and benets systems, reducing the tax wedge by almost 25% and implementing stricter
assessments for benet receivers. Unemployment began to decrease to reach today one
of the lowest in Europe. The result for Spain has improved a bit, however the change
in unemployment is still underestimated.
6Due to missing values, the change in unemployment for some countries covers slightly di¤erent
time periods: Belgium: 1990 to 2001, Denmark: 1990 to 1999, Ireland: 1990 to 1998, Japan: 1990 to
2000, Sweden, Finland and Germany: 1989 to 2003, New Zealand and Portugal do not appear because
of too many missing variables.
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Turning now to the robustness, the results of this estimation remain generally sig-
nicant if we drop one country at the time. Exceptions are Italy, where the coe¢ cient
of unemployment benet duration turns out to be insignicant and Portugal, where
the same happens for union density. If we take out the time e¤ects, EPL becomes sig-
nicant and union density, which was already signicant before, gains in importance,
while the coe¢ cient of unemployment benet duration becomes insignicant. Overall
we can say that the results are robust to most changes in the sample of countries.
2 The E¤ects of Product and Labour Market Regulation on
Unemployment
This section aims at analyzing the e¤ects of product and labour market regulation on
the unemployment rate. The rst question one should raise is what exactly is product
market regulation? There are di¤erent kinds of regulations, aiming at protecting sec-
tors of the economy. Public ownership is one way of controlling an industry. Another
way is restricting the freedom of action of rms. This can be done by introducing for
example high entry costs, making it less attractive for rms to enter the market or by
intervening in the output or price setting decision of the rm. Some regulations were
introduced aiming at maximizing social welfare or protecting the interests of society.
Though as time goes by the design of such institutions may become obsolete: because
of technological progress, new and more e¤ective ways of dealing with this problem
emerge. Another problem is that ine¢ ciencies can appear, leading nally to "govern-
ment failure". Politicians pursue their interests, in order to win elections, even if it may
be costly. This can cause the institutions to become more costly than the ine¢ ciencies
emerging in the non-regulated environment. The ndings in the literature support the
view that product market deregulation has positive medium to long run e¤ects on the
unemployment rate.
The model in this section is taken from the paper "Macroeconomic E¤ects of Reg-
ulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets" (2003) by Olivier Blanchard
and Francesco Giavazzi. The rst subsection illustrates the main model, the bargaining
procedure, di¤erentiates between short and long run and explains what deregulation
can look like. Then we focus on the equilibrium outcomes and bring up important dif-
ferences in short and long run. The next subsection depicts the e¤ects of deregulation
on the labour and product market and sums up the main ndings of Blanchard and
Giavazzi. Finally we include a measure of product market regulation in the regression
of unemployment and analyze the results.
2.1 The Model
Each rm utilizes labour to produce a di¤erentiated good. In the goods market there
rules monopolistic competition (which means that rms have a certain power over the
prices they set). In the labour market wages are determined through bargaining.
In the short run the number of rms cannot change, whereas in the long run the
number of rms is endogenous and rms can enter and exit the market. The uctuation
16
of rms depends on the entry condition. It is assumed that the entry cost as well as the
degree of competition in the goods market are determined by product market regulation
and the bargaining power of the workers by the degree of labour market regulation.
2.1.1 Workers
Each worker/consumer j of the labour force L has his utility function as follows:
Vj =
"
m 1=
mX
i=1
C
( 1)=
ij
#=( 1)
He consumes all the goods equally, such that Cij = Cj=m. This implies that an
increase in the number of products m does not directly lead to an increase in utility.
The elasticity of substitution increases with the number of products, but this means that
also the elasticity of demand increases, which is exactly what happens if the product
market is deregulated: the number of rms increases and therefore also the number of
goods produced, leading to a reduction of the monopoly power of the rms. Worker
j can decide each period if he works or not (he supplies 1 or 0 units of work). In
this model there are no savings, all his income is spent on consumption. The budget
constraint is as follows:
mX
i=1
PiCij = WjNj + Pf(u)(1 Nj)
Here Nj is the labour supply of worker j. It can either take the value 0 in the case
the worker decides not to work in that period, or the value 1 if he decides to work. Pi
represents the price of good i. f(u) is the reservation wage, a decreasing function of
the unemployment rate. The price index depends on the elasticity of demand and the
number of goods and is given by:
P 
 
1
m
mX
i=1
P
(1 )
i
!1=(1 )
The worker spends all his labour income on consumption if he works and all his
non labour income if he doesnt. We assume that higher unemployment causes the
reservation wage to fall, and workers to have more incentive to nd a job. This is the
case since the reservation wage is a decreasing function of the unemployment rate. By
using the budget constraint the utility of worker j in each period is as follows:
[Wj=P   f(u)]Nj + f(u)
This implies that the utility of the workers is decreasing with prices and increasing
with the total number of workers. The more workers, the more products are produced
(and since one rm only produces one good), the more rms are in the market. This
leads to an increase in competition and to lower prices.
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2.1.2 Products and Firms
Since each rm only produces one di¤erentiate good, i is the common index for product
and rm. The production function of rm i is as follows:
Yi = Ni
The productivity of labour is in this case equal to one, and production does only
depend on the amount of labour (no capital input). The nominal prot of rm i is
given by:
(Pi  Wi)Ni
2.1.3 Bargaining
In each period workers can decide if they want to work or not. Each rm bargains
with L=m workers, since the number of workers is equal in each rm. Firms and the
workers determine through Nash-bargaining the optimal wage and employment level
for the period.
 log [(Wi   Pf(u))Ni] + (1  ) log [(Pi  Wi)Ni]
This expression shows how the rents of the rm are shared between rm and workers.
 represents the bargaining power of the workers. The expression weighted with 
represents the share going to the workers or the surplus of worker from working in rm
i. As we can see the expression depends on the reservation wage, meaning that if the
reservation wage is low (implying a high unemployment rate) the surplus for workers
increases. This is straightforward, since more unemployed mean higher competition
for job seekers and therefore they appreciate more a job in a rm. The second term
represents the share going to the rm.
Assuming "e¢ cient bargaining" we can allow in the short run workers having higher
wages without having negative e¤ects on employment, since their bargaining power can
increase and the number of rms is xed.
2.1.4 Short and Long Run
We assume that in the short run the number of rms is exogenously given, while in
the long run the number of rms is endogenous, depending on an entry cost c and the
distribution of rents in the short run. If the rents for the rms in the short run are low,
new rms have less incentives to enter the market or might even exit in the long run.
The entry cost c can be seen as a sort of product market regulation. It could be
some kind of administrative barrier, governmental restriction, etc... So, c is assumed to
be a shadow cost. Furthermore c is proportional to the output/employment in order to
facilitate the determination of the long run equilibrium. The prot rate in the long run
has to equal c. This implies that the economy converges to a competitive equilibrium
when c goes to zero.
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2.1.5 Regulation
Two parameters in this model can capture product market regulation, namely c and .
If the entry cost decreases, rms, that couldnt enter the market before, are now enabled
to start business. An increase in , which means an increase in substitutability, can
be caused by the implementation of trade alliances, reducing tari¤ barriers or making
foreign and domestic products more comparable.
The parameter, that captures labour market regulation is . The bargaining power
of the workers can be a¤ected by the unemployment rate, meaning that if there are many
unemployed, there are many potential candidates for a vacancy too, the competition
between workers is higher and the bargaining power low. But  is also inuenced by
the existing regulations on the labour market, like for example restrictions on layo¤s,
high severance payments, etc.
Those three parameters are therefore essential for determining the distribution of
rents between rms and workers, and furthermore for determining the macroeconomic
equilibrium.
2.2 Equilibrium
2.2.1 Short Run Partial Equilibrium
The partial equilibrium can be seen for example as the equilibrium in a certain goods
market, which is independent of the prices and wages of other markets. The demand
for good i by workers and rms is as follows:
Yi = (Y=m)(Pi=P )
 
If the relative price equals one, total demand for good i would be Y=m.   repre-
sents here the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price. This means that
if  increases the demand of rm i would decrease. We now can proceed and dene the
relative prices, which are given by:
Pi=P = [1 + (m)] f(u)
This expression shows that the relative prices depend not only on the rms markup
but also on the unemployment rate. (m) represents the markup of the relative price
over the reservation wage and is given by:
(m) = 1= [g(m)  1]
, where g0(m)  0. This implies that the markup is a decreasing function of m. The
more goods are produced in the market, the lower the markup for the rm. Which is
straightforward, since if there are more products, there are also more rms and more
competition. The real consumption wage is given by:
Wi=P = [1 + (m)] f(u)
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The real wage is therefore an increasing function of  and (m). This implies that
workers earn a higher real wage if their bargaining power and the markup of the rms
is high. The high markup means that the share of the rents that workers can receive
is also higher. We have come now to the crucial part of the partial equilibrium. What
happens if only a small part of the economy is deregulated? Prices and also the rents of
incumbent rms in this industry will decrease, while prices of all other goods (produced
by rms in the regulated market) remain the same. Workersshares of the rents in those
rms will also be smaller. The result of such a partial deregulation will be that the
purchasing power of individuals falls. On the one hand workers get less out of the
bargaining, on the other hand prices for most of the goods remain at a high level and
consumers only prot from the lower price in the deregulated part of the economy. In
the general equilibrium the situation changes, as we will see shortly.
2.2.2 Short Run General Equilibrium
The di¤erence to the short run partial equilibrium is now that the prices rms choose
for their goods can no longer be chosen freely. We assume that Pi=P = 1. If we put
this result in our relative price equation we nd that:
1 = [1 + (m)] f(u)
Since in the short run the number of rms is xed, the level of competition  is also
xed and equal to g(m). The same happens for (m) since it depends only on  and
the number of rms. If we replace f(u) in the real wage equation by 1= [1 + (m)] we
nd:
Wi=P = (1 + (m))= [1 + (m)]
What are now the e¤ects of our parameters in the short run general equilibrium?
The real wage is still increasing with the bargaining power of workers, so here nothing
has changed compared to the partial equilibrium. On the other hand, di¤erent to the
previous case, the real wage is now decreasing with the markup of the rm, (m).
In case of deregulation ((m) decreases) individuals prot more as consumers (lower
prices due to more competition) than they lose as workers (lower rents because of lower
markup of rms). In other words, the general decline in the price level will outweight
the lower rents of the rms and therefore will lead to an increase in real wages.
2.2.3 Long Run General Equilibrium
The di¤erence to the short run general equilibrium is that the number of rms is
endogenous. It depends on the entry cost c and the markup (m). Prots per worker
have to be equal to the entry cost, given by:
c = [(m)(1  )] = [1 + (m)]
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The equilibrium number of rms is given by:
g(m)= (1  )=c
g(m)= (1  )=c
We obtain this expression by replacing (m) in the denition of the entry cost by
1=(   1). From this term we can deduce that if the degree of competition is high,
if  is high, the rents of rms are decreasing and rms are less attracted by entering
the market. If the bargaining power of workers increase, the share of rents that goes
to rms also decreases and rms are less likely to enter the market. And last but not
least, an increasing entry cost means that rms have to produce higher rents in order to
break even, which may not be possible for all rms. In short, the equilibrium number
of products decreases with , c and . Lets turn now to the unemployment rate, which
is given by:
f(u) = 1  c=(1  )
The form of this expression implies that it increases with the entry cost and the
bargaining power of workers. In other words, if the entry cost is high less rms enter
the market because they need higher rents to survive. If workers have more bargaining
power, the share of rents going to rms decreases and less rms enter the market in
the long run. This causes a drop in employment, an increase in unemployment and
consequently a decrease in the reservation wage. The real wage is given by:
Wi=P = 1  c
We nd this result by replacing (m) by c=(1     c) in the real wage equation of
the short run general equilibrium (Proof see Appendix 1). What is now the e¤ect of
, (m) and c? In the short run an increase in workers bargaining power implied an
increase in the real wage, but this is no longer the case: If the share of rents going to
rms decreases, the number of rms will decrease in the long run, the markup of the
remaining rms increases and the result will be higher unemployment and lower real
wages. On the whole, real wages in the long run are no longer a¤ected by the bargaining
power of workers. A decrease in the markup, which led in the short run to an increase
in real wages has also no impact in the long run. A lower markup causes in the short
run higher real wages, but would lead to less rms in the long run and consequently
to lower employment rates and higher unemployment. With less rms in the market,
the degree of competition decreases, while the markup and prices increase, leading to
lower real wages. If the entry cost increases less rms enter the market in the long run,
leading again to less competition, higher prices and lower real wages.
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2.3 Deregulation
2.3.1 Product Market
How can we imagine a measure which leads to product market deregulation? As we al-
ready saw before, we could think of a policy applied by the government, which increases
competition in product market, namely . In the short run, more competition, given
the same number of rms, leads to a more elastic demand, and rms tend to lower their
markup. Prices decrease and real wage increase while unemployment decreases. In
the short run more competition appears to have only positive inuences on the labour
market.
However in the long run negative e¤ects appear. The number of rms will decrease,
since they expect lower rents, leading to an increase in unemployment. Less rms mean
a higher markup: Firms increase their prices, such that real wages adjust. In this case,
the entry cost c didnt change. This means that if competition increases and entry cost
is still high the number of rms in the long run will decrease and the favorable short run
e¤ects will disappear. Whereas if the entry cost decreased when competition increases,
rms would have more incentives to enter the market, even with higher competition.
We now assume a decrease in c. As we already know, this will not have any e¤ects
in the short run, since the number of rms is xed. In the long run however, rms have
a greater incentive to enter the market and the number of rms increases. With more
rms in the market competition among them increases, leading to lower prices and con-
sequently higher real wages for workers. The second e¤ect is an increase in employment
caused by the entrance of new rms, leading to a decrease in the unemployment rate.
There is however a potential problem concerning incumbent rms: The overall em-
ployment level increases, but those rms who were already in the market now face higher
competition and may decrease their employment. This will lead to the opposition of
the workers in those incumbent rms.
In both cases there is no intertemporal trade o¤ between unemployment and real
wages. In our rst case, in the short run real wages increase and unemployment de-
creases and in the long run we come back to the pre-deregulation level. In our second
case, nothing changes in the short run, while in the long run unemployment falls and
real wages increase. As we will see shortly, this is not the case for the deregulation of
the labour market.
2.3.2 Labour Market
We can think of a deregulation in the labour market as a decrease in . The short
run e¤ect will be that the share of rents, which goes to workers decreases, leading to
an increase in the prot rate for rms. So, in the short run, workers lose, since they
have lower real wages and there is no e¤ect on employment. In the long run, the higher
prot rate leads to a larger number of rms (rms enter the market until the prot
rate equals again c). As more rms enter, the markup decreases leading to lower prices,
higher real wages and unemployment decreases. Actually, the real wages return to the
pre-deregulation level and unemployment is lower than before. So, in this case there
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is an intertemporal trade o¤: In the short run workers have to su¤er from lower real
wages, while in the long run, their real wages will go back to the initial level and the
unemployment rate will decrease. Labour market deregulation is therefore fought by
workers and di¢ cult to implement by the government. People dont want their wages
to decrease, even if later on they will adjust.
2.3.3 Policy Options for Deregulation
What would be the best way to deregulate? The answer is that one should combine
labour market and product market deregulation. Since labour market deregulation
will probably lead to opposition of the workers, the rst step should be to deregulate
product markets. As we saw already, this means more competition for rms and lower
rents. Those rents are not only important for rms but also for workers, since they get
a share, depending on , of those rents. But as rents decrease, the share workers can
appropriate falls and they have less incentive to ght for it. In short, one is more likely
to accept a decrease in wages if those wages are lower (the loss is not that painful).
Another important aspect, that should not be neglected, is the dimension of dereg-
ulation: It is much more favorable to deregulate the whole market at once than to do
it step by step. The explanation lies in the partial equilibrium we saw earlier. If only
a part of the economy is deregulated the partial equilibrium e¤ect will dominate the
general equilibrium e¤ect. We know that in the partial equilibrium the gain of con-
sumers (namely lower prices) is outweighed by the loss of workers (namely lower rents).
Overall, workers in a deregulated part of the economy would lose if the dimension of
deregulation is too small. An example would be, the deregulation of the pen produc-
tion. Workers in the pen industry would prot from lower prices of pens but su¤er
from a decrease in real wages, since all other prices remain the same but their share of
rents decreases. In short, a government should start its deregulation program with the
product market and then go on with the labour market.
2.4 Econometric Findings
In order to analyze the e¤ect of product market regulation on the unemployment rate, I
used the same data set as in the rst section of this paper. I added a variable measuring
the degree of product market regulation coming from the OECD database. The variable
covers the level of regulation in seven energy and service industries. Its values range
from 0 to 6, where 0 indicates a very low degree of regulation and 6 a very high degree.
As we can see in Figure 3, PMR has decreased since the 80s in all countries of the sample.
The most heavily regulated sectors in OECD countries are the energy, transport and
communication sectors. This is the case because rms in those market segments have
to fulll social goals, which is for example the case for public transportations. In order
to assure the provision of those goods, public ownership or legal restrictions are seen as
a way to do so. But with increasing international competition, those protected market
segments have to become more competitive. Some measures, which are taken in order
to make these markets more open are to reduce the entry cost and state ownership.
Since the 80s many regulations have been eliminated or eased. The overall trend of
23
OECD countries in this dataset is the reduction in PMR. While in the 80s the highest
PMR value was about 6 it dropped to about 3 in 2003. The di¤erences across countries
also diminished: in 1983 the di¤erence between the most and the less regulated country
was 3 points, while it decreased to 2 points in 2003.
Figure 3
Change in PMR since 1983
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Regarding EPL, OECD countries with strict legislations tend to ease regulations.
But there is also the inverse trend, meaning that some countries where EPL is low tend
to increase the strictness. Most reforms intended to increase labour market exibility,
by facilitating xed-term contracts or part time work. In Austria and New Zealand
there were also reforms on the regulations of permanent employment such as reducing
the barriers for dismissals. In a nutshell, EPL strictness varies still a lot across countries.
Although the main pattern in the 80s and 90s was to ease EPL strictness, some countries
like Spain tightened it for xed contracts, but loosened it for temporary agency work.
On the other hand we have France, where overall strictness increased during the past
decades. Generally EPL is stricter in the southern countries as well as in France.
Germany had important reforms, causing a decrease in strictness, but has in 2003 still
one of the highest EPL levels across OECD countries. The countries with the lowest
regulation-levels are the USA, New Zealand and Great Britain.
2.4.1 Estimation with PMR and Output Gap
The results, depicted in Table 6, are quite satisfying. The coe¢ cient of product market
regulation is signicant and positive, which means that a higher level of regulation has a
negative e¤ect on unemployment. This result suggests that the positive long run e¤ects
dominate. We saw already that in the long run product market deregulation leads
to an increase in real wages, because of more competition and lower markups, and to
a decrease in unemployment, because of the entry of new rms. On the other hand
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in the short run there can appear adjustment problems. In an environment with low
competition, rms tend to be less e¢ cient or productive and wages to be higher (since
the rents of the rms are also higher and wages are determined in part by rents). If the
government introduces a new law causing an increase in competition, rms will have
to increase their competitiveness. One reaction could be to reduce wages or even lay
o¤ workers. The consequence is a period of high unemployment. If this unemployment
will be absorbed quickly or be more permanent depends in part on labour market
institutions like the unemployment benets. Benets depending on the former wage,
which was high because of the high rents rms earned, can lead to a lower search
intensity of the unemployed and to a longer period of high unemployment. Unemployed
may not accept jobs with lower wages, since they receive high unemployment benets.
As we can see an increase in competition can lead in the short run to additional
unemployment, whose amplitude depends in part on labour market institutions, while
the long run e¤ects have a positive impact on labour market performance.
Table 6
Unemployment Estimation with PMR (xed e¤ects)
Coe¢ cient (t-statistic) Deviations from cross-country m ean Impact of sho ck on u
(1) (2) (3)
Replacem ent Rate 0.13 (7.52) -29.33 35.26 -2 .81 5.58
Tax Wedge 0.27 (10.99) -22.23 16.86 -5 .00 5.55
PMR 0.62 (3.05) -2 .76 2.19 -0 .71 2.36
Union Density -0 .03 (1.92) -31.38 44.28 1.94 -0 .33
H igh Corp oratism -0.99 (-2 .67) -0 .55 0.45 1.54 0.55
EPL -0.08 (-0 .23) -1 .87 2.12 1.15 0.83
Benet Duration -2 .73 (-3 .67) -0 .33 0.99 1.90 -1 .70
Output Gap -0.49 (-15.12) -11.27 7.24 6.52 -2 .55
R2 (w ith in) 0.69
R2 0.92
Country and T im e Dumm ies yes
Observations 434
In column (2) the deviations of the independent variables from the cross-country
mean are depicted . Those deviations are important in order to calculate the impact
of an adverse shock on unemployment. The way to read column (3) is as follows:
We assume that the shock will increase unemployment by 1% in the "mean country",
namely the country where all institutions have the mean value. The left number in (3)
shows by how much unemployment would increase in a country, where all institutions
have the mean values except one, which has the lowest value for a given institution.
Lets take PMR as an example: While a shock in the "mean country" would increase
unemployment by 1%, it would lead to a decrease of 0.71% in the country having the
lowest regulations on product markets. On the other hand the country with the highest
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PMR level (all other institutions at mean value) would have to su¤er from an increase
of 2.36% in unemployment. Figure 4 depicts the results of the previous regression.
Figure 4
Observed vs. Predicted Change in Unemployment from 1990 to 2003
(Germany, Finland and Sweden: 1989 to 2003)
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3 The E¤ects of Labour Relations on the Unemployment Rate
Only recently economists became aware of the potential importance of relations between
employer and employee in the attempt to explain the evolution of unemployment. The
paper "The Quality of Labour Relations and Unemployment", where the model in this
section comes from, was written in 2006 by Olivier Blanchard and Thomas Philippon.
They show that in countries where labour relations are usually bad, the unemployment
rate tends to be higher. A rst approach was to connect the past behavior of gov-
ernments towards unions with todays labour relations in order to show that a hostile
environment in the past leads to more conictual labour relations today. The reason
why bad labour relations can turn into high unemployment lies in arising bargaining
failures and ine¢ ciencies, as will be shown subsequently.
The rst subsection presents the main model by depicting the bargaining game.
Then will be discussed the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium which depend
on the reputation of the rm. Subsection 3 denes the unemployment rate, while
Subsections 4 and 5 illustrate the equilibrium outcome and the sustainable equilibria.
After having presented the model, we will perform an application, clarifying the impact
of bad labour relations on the unemployment rate. In a last step we analyze the inuence
of labour relations in a set of European and non-European countries, in order to see if
we can nd signicant results, conrming empirically the rationals behind the model
of Blanchard and Philippon.
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3.1 The Model
It is basically a standard search/matching model with asymmetric information. The
bargaining game begins with the match of rm and worker. Only the rm knows the
initial productivity y, and has the option to lie about productivity7. Two kinds of
productivities exist namely high or low productivity: yh occurs with probability p; yl
occurs with probability 1  p. The average productivity y is dened by:
y = pyh + (1  p)yl
With probability  a new productivity is drawn. This means that the rm either
remains in the current state of productivity or the productivity changes. The reputation
of the rm is given by  and can be either good (  g) or bad (  b). Firms only
have an incentive to lie if their real productivity is high. The match surpluses for the
di¤erent productivities are: S(yh; ) and S(yl; ) and the average surplus is given by:
S()  Ey [S(y; )]
The match surplus is then dened as follows:
S(y; ) = J(y; )  V +W (y; )  U
It is divided in the surplus of workers W (y; )   U and rms J(y; )   V . When
workers get a job their surplus consists of the wage they earn minus the opportunity cost
of working (namely the value of being unemployed). For rms this surplus is dened
by the value to the rm of having an employee minus the value of having a vacancy.
 The bargaining game works as follows:
Through the bargaining process the wage of the worker and consequently the share
of the surplus going to the rm will be determined. This bargaining game is a version
of Rubensteins model (1982)8 with imperfect information. The rst step is an initial
wage o¤er W of the rm to the worker. In this stage of the bargaining game rms have
an incentive to lie, namely to announce a low productivity and to o¤er a low wage to
the worker. The worker then can either reject this initial o¤er with probability s, or
accept it, with probability 1   s. Since the worker doesnt know the real productivity
of the rm when he starts the bargaining process, he also doesnt know if the rm lies,
meaning if the productivity is really low and he therefore should get the lower wage.
But workers can see ex-post whether the rm has told the truth or not. Actually, with
a certain probability , as already seen before, a new productivity is drawn. When this
happens, again, rms know their new productivity but workers dont. Workers only
7Only if the productivity is high, rms have an incentive to lie and to o¤er a low wage.
8Rubinstein describes this bargaining procedure in his paper "Perfect Equilibrium In A Bargaining
Model" (1982) as follows: "Two players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of size 1.
Each has to make in turn, a proposal as to how it should be divided. After one player has made an
o¤er, the other must decide either to accept it, or to reject it and continue the bargaining."
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know the real productivity of the past period. If the rm lied in the period before and
said that productivity was low, but it actually was high, workers wont believe the rm
in the second period (after the new draw of productivity) if she again announces low
productivity. What happens is that once a rm lied, the reputation of the rm goes to
badin the next period and workers will always decline the low wage o¤er of the rm,
even when the rm claims that there was no change in productivity.
Lets come back to the bargaining process: If the worker accepts the initial wage
o¤er the rm makes, the match takes place. If he rejects, a share  of the surplus is
destroyed. The worker makes a counter o¤er W c, which the rm has to accept, if she
wants the match to take place. If she doesnt accept the match ends. This counter o¤er
is given by:
W c(y; ) = U + (1  )S(y; )
The worker will o¤er a wage equal to the value of being unemployed plus a share
1    of the total match surplus. The worker will only accept an initial wage W (y; )
of at least W c(y; ). The value of the rm from being in a match is the value of having
a vacancy plus the share  of the surplus, which goes to the rm: (Proof see Appendix
1)
J(y; ) = V + S(y; )
In other words, we can see  as the bargaining power of the rm. Now that we
have dened the bargaining game, we should focus on the truth telling incentives of the
rms. In order to analyze those we consider two cases: the non-cooperative equilibrium,
plyed by rms with a bad reputation and the cooperative equilibrium, played by rms
with a good reputiation.
3.1.1 Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Equilibrium
 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
Firms with a bad reputation play the non-cooperative equilibrium. Since workers
dont know the productivity, rms can choose to lie or to tell the truth. Which way
they go depends on the surpluses they get. If the surplus obtained by lying is higher
than the one from telling the truth, rms will lie. Actually, this must only be examined
for the case of high productivity, since the rm doesnt have any incentive to lie if its
productivity is already low. Short, the value for the rm with yh if telling the truth
has to be at least equal to the value of lying in order to prevent the rm from lying:
S(yh; b) W (yh; b)  (1  s) S(yh; b) W (yl; b)+ s (1  )S(yh; b) W c(yl; b)
On the left hand side we can see the value to the rm with bad reputation if telling
the truth about productivity. The rm gets the surplus of yh and has to pay the
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wages W (yh; b): Workers will always accept this high wage o¤er, even if the rm has
a bad reputation. On the right hand side we see the value to the rm if lying about
productivity. The rst term, weighted with (1   s); represents what the rm gets
if the worker accepts the wage o¤er W (yl; b). The second term represents the other
alternative, namely the worker rejects and makes a counter o¤er W c(yl; b). In this case
a part of the surplus, namely S(yh; b), is destroyed. If we assume that the values of
lying and telling the truth are equal we can derive the probability s(b), that the worker
rejects the initial o¤er of the rm (Proof see Appendix 1).
s(b) =
1  

 S(y
h; b)  S(yl; b)
S(yh; b)
The higher the di¤erence between the surplus of high and low productivity, the
higher the gains for the rm if announcing low productivity, when the actual productiv-
ity is high. In other words, the larger the di¤erence between high and low productivity,
the higher must be the rejection rate s(b) in order to prevent the rm from lying. This
means that if the workers reject more often, it is more probable that a share  of the
surplus will be destroyed and rms will not risk to o¤er a lower wage. What is new
in this model is that the behavior of the rm a¤ects the separation rate and therefore
also the unemployment rate. Firms with bad behavior cause wages to be more often
renegotiated, since workers do not trust rms anymore. If the renegotiation fails, the
worker may leave the rm and unemployment increases. The crucial question is how to
prevent rms from lying about productivity? The way to make the truth more attrac-
tive for rms is to increase their surplus if they are honest and to punish them with a
lower surplus if they arent. If rms for example expect the rejection rate of workers
to be very high, meaning that during bargaining workers reject more often the initial
wage o¤er of the rm, it becomes more costly for rms to negotiate and they will try
to avoid additional bargaining. Another way of increasing the cost of lying is a high
deadweight loss, which is the loss that appears if the worker rejects the o¤er of the rm.
Since rms only have an incentive to lie if productivity is high, a very low degree of
uncertainty in the economy (meaning no di¤erence between high and low productivity)
will also motivate rms to tell the truth. If the match does not take place, rms have
a deadweight loss given by:
D(b) = (1  p)s(b)S(yl; b)
This deadweight loss only occurs if workers reject the initial wage o¤er and the rm
announces a low productivity. The average deadweight loss is therefore the share of the
surplus which is destroyed.
 Cooperative Equilibrium
Firms with good reputation sustain the equilibrium by a trigger strategy. If they ever
lie, their reputation switches to bad. In this case the dynamic truth telling constrain is
given by:
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S(yh; g) W (yh; g) + 
r +  + 
J(g)  S(yh; g) W (yl; g) + 
r +  + 
J(b)
This expression implies that the value for the rm with good reputation if telling
the truth and announcing high productivity must be strictly higher than the value for
lying. If the rm lies, its surplus today is higher than if telling the truth, but because
we assume a trigger strategy, in the future the rm will have a bad reputation and the
surpluses of  = b. Firms with good reputation dont have a deadweight loss, since
workers never reject their o¤ers. On the left hand side we can see the value to the rm
if always telling the truth. In the rst period they get the surplus of high productivity
and also have to pay the wages of high productivity. The second term represents the
future surpluses given the rm has a good reputation. The right hand side shows the
value to the rm if lying. In the rst period the prot is higher, since she only has to
pay the wages of low productivity, but the future prots will be lower, since the rm
will have deadweight losses9. If rms are shortsighted, they weight more todays than
future prots and would prefer to lie in the rst period and to have afterwards a bad
reputation.
In this model rms can choose either to lie about their productivity and therefore
have a bad reputation in the long run or to tell the truth. But how does the rm decide
on whether lying or telling the truth? As we will see later, it depends on the degree of
uncertainty in the economy but also on the deadweight loss, the probability of rejection,
s(b), and , the share of the surplus going to the rm. Until here we only have dened
the truth-telling constraints for both equilibriums.
3.1.2 Unemployment
The unemployment rate is determined like in the standard search/match model. A
share u of the worker is unemployed and a share 1  u of the workers is employed. The
job vacancies are given by the rate v. The matches are determined by the matching
function m(u; v). The labour market tightness is measured by   v
u
. A high  means
more vacancies per unemployed, and it is therefore di¢ cult for rms to ll a vacancy,
meaning that the labour market is tight. If  is low, on the contrary, the number of
unemployed is high relatively to the number of vacancies, and rms can easily nd an
employee. q()  m
v
represents the matching rate for vacancies and is decreasing with
. q() is the matching rate for the unemployed and is increasing in . In other words,
the tighter the labour market (high ), the more vacancies are available and the easier
it is for unemployed to nd a job. The unemployment rate evolves as follows:
_u = (1  u)  q()u
9 J() denes the average pre-bargaining match value to a rm. This value is lower for rms with
bad reputation, since they have to pay a deadweight loss.
J(g) = V +  S()
J(b) = V +  S()  D(b)
30
, where  represents the job destruction rate:  of the jobs nd an end, meaning
that a proportion of (1   u) of the employed gets red. At the same time q()u (a
proportion of the unemployed workers) nd a job. If more workers nd than lose a job
the unemployment rate falls, and vice versa. If we assume, that we are in a steady
state, the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
u =

 + q()
3.1.3 Equilibrium
This subsection is dedicated to dening the macroeconomic equilibrium of this model.
We want to determine the equilibrium value of , the share of the rms with good
behavior. In order to do this, we rst need to calculate the surplus in the equilibrium
and the deadweight loss of rms. We assume free entry of the rms. The surplus with
productivity y and reputation  is given by:
rS(y; ) = y   r(U + V )  S(y; ) +   S()  D()  S(y; )
y   r(U + V ) is the ow revenue of a match (taking into account the opportunity
cost for workers and rms, namely U and V ). S(y; ) is the loss if the match ends,
which happens with probability . 

S()  D()  S(y; ) is the gain or loss if a
new productivity is drawn, which happens with probability . Let  be the di¤erence
between high and low productivity, such that yh = y+ (1  p) and yl = y  p. The
di¤erence between high and low surplus is then given by10:
S(yh; )  S(yl; ) = 
r +  + 
The worker matches with probability  with a rm with good reputation, the average
matching value for the worker is therefore:
E

W e()
   W e(g) + (1  ) W e(b)
The ow utility of being unemployed is given by u
¯
. The value of being unemployed,
rU , is given by u
¯
+q()

E( W e())  U. As long as the worker is unemployed he
gets u
¯
, and with probability q() he nds a job and from then on gets the value of
being employed. By replacing E( W e()) by U + (1   ) S(), the lowest initial o¤er
the worker would accept, we nd:
rU =u
¯
+ q()

E(U + (1  ) S())  U
rU =u
¯
+ q()(1  )E( S())
The expectations of the average surplus with respect to reputation  are:
10We dene S(yh; ) = S()+ (1 p)r++ as the surplus of high productivity and S(y
l; ) = S()  pr++
as the surplus of low productivity
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E

S()

=
y   rU   (1  ) D(b)
r + 
If we replace now rU by u
¯
+ q()(1  )E( S()) we nd: (Proof see Appendix 1)
E

S()

=
y   u
¯
  (1  ) D(b)
r +  + q()(1  )
This expression gives us the expected average surplus. Its the discounted value
of productivity, considering the ow utility of being unemployed, u
¯
. (1   ) D(b)
represents the loss due to a new draw of productivity, which happens with probability
 and only occurs if the rm has a bad reputation (probability is 1  ). By using the
value of having a vacancy rV =  c + q() [E [Je()]  V ], which should be equal to
zero because of the free entry condition we nd an expression characterizing the market
tightness: (Proof see Appendix 1)
c
q()
= E

S()
  (1  ) D(b)
As we can deduce from this equation, a higher deadweight loss, meaning a higher
share of the surplus which is destroyed if the match doesnt take place, means that it
becomes more di¢ cult to nd a job for workers. In other words, If D(b) increases, the
RHS of this expression decreases and consequently the matching rate for rms, namely
q(), has to increase. As we saw earlier, q() is a decreasing function of : This means
that if q() increases  decreases and the labour market becomes less tight and its
easier for a rm to ll a job vacancy. Since there are more unemployed relative to
vacancies, rms have less di¢ culties to nd workers, but on the other hand workers are
confronted with a lower matching rate.
If we replace now E

S()

by y u¯ (1 )
D(b)
r++q()(1 ) we dene the equilibrium of this search
model:
c
q()
= 
y   u
¯
  (1  ) D(b)
r +  + q()(1  )   (1  )
D(b)
If we assume that all rms have a good reputation and therefore the deadweight
loss equals zero, we have the outcome of the general search matching model. In order
to solve this problem, we have to dene the deadweight loss as a function of . As
we saw earlier the probability that a worker rejects the initial o¤er of the rm was
s(b) = 1 

S(yh;b) S(yl;b)
S(yh;b)
. We also know that the di¤erence between the high and low
productivity surpluses is given by S(yh; )  S(yl; ) = 
r++
. By replacing S(yh; ) 
S(yl; ) by 
r++
in the rst expression we obtain:
s(b) =
1  


r +  + 
1
S(yh; b)
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As we saw already, the average deadweight loss D(b) is equal to (1 p)s(b)S(yl; b).
In order to rewrite the expression of the deadweight loss as a function of , we use in a
rst step the denition of s(b), we have derived before, and then we replace S(yh; b) by
S(b) + (1 p)
r++
, and S(yl; b) by S(b)  p
r++
:
D(b)= (1  p)(1  ) 
r +  + 
S(yl; b)
S(yh; b)
D(b)= (1  p)(1  ) 
r +  + 
S(b)  p
r++
S(b) + (1 p)
r++
The average surplus of a rm with bad reputation is then given by:
S(b) = E

S()
   D(b)
r + 
From the derived equations we can say that:
*)  is increasing with  and decreasing with .
In other words, if there are many rms with good reputation the number of ine¢ cient
separations will decrease, meaning that the matching rate of the workers q() increases,
since the labour market becomes tighter for rms ( increases). As a consequence there
are more vacancies per unemployed and unemployment rate decreases. If, on the other
hand, the degree of uncertainty in the economy increases, meaning that yh yl increases,
rms have more incentive to lie about their productivity, since they get more surplus
out of it. The probability of rejection, s(b), also increases, meaning that workers will
decline more often the initial wage o¤er of the rm. This implies that the labour market
becomes laxer for rms (decreasing  and q()), there are more unemployed relatively
to vacancies and consequently the unemployment rate increases.
*) D(b) is decreasing with  and increasing with .
This means the average deadweight loss is lower if there are more rms with good
reputation, which is straightforward, since only rms with bad reputation have a dead-
weight loss. Furthermore if the degree of uncertainty increases the gains from lying
increase and rms have a higher incentive to lie. There will be more rms with a bad
reputation. Therefore the probability of rejection of the workers, s(b), has to be higher,
which means that workers will reject more often the wage o¤ers of the rms, leading
to a higher separation rate and to a less tight labour market for rms (low ). This
implies that q() is also decreasing and the unemployment rate increases.
3.1.4 Sustainable Equilibria
Now that we have dened the equilibrium, we should determine for which values of
 the equilibrium is sustainable. We know that the di¤erence between the average
surplus if having a good reputation, S(g), and the average surplus if having a bad
reputation, S(b), is given by y r(U V )
r+
  y r(U V )  D(b)
r+
. If we replace S(g)  S(b) in the
truth telling constraint of the cooperative equilibrium by this expression, we nd the
dynamic truth-telling constraint given by (Proof see Appendix 1):
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 D(b)

1 +

r + 

 (1  )
If r +  increases, rms weight less the long run gains from telling the truth. As
already explained before, they would prefer in this case to have in the rst period higher
prots from lying and in the next periods a bad reputation. If in the next period a
new productivity is drawn, the rm, having now a bad reputation, will have to face
wage renegotiations, since workers will not believe what the rm is telling them. Even
if productivity hasnt changed, workers will renegotiate their wages, since they suspect
that the rm lies. As we can see, if rms are not forward looking, they dont take into
account future losses due to the bad reputation, and do only look at the gains they can
earn by lying in the rst period, which makes trust more di¢ cult to sustain.
How can we now interpret the inuence of ? As we know  is the share of rms
with good reputation. How will rms react if  changes? We assume that the maximum
degree of trust is given by , that 0     and that  = 0 is always an equilibrium.
  = 1 if the dynamic truth-telling constraint holds for this value of .
 0    1 if the dynamic truth-telling constraint holds for  = 0, but not for
 = 1.
Equilibria with higher values for , but always lower than , pareto-dominate equi-
libria with lower values for . The quality of labour relations is characterized by eco-
nomic, but also by non-economic factors. Economic factors are for example the degree
of trust. We assume that European countries have roughly the same economic situation,
therefore changes is  are assumed to come from shocks, which a¤ect , the maximum
degree of trust.
3.2 Application
In order to understand the implications of this model, we can assume the following
example: One country is characterized by a very high and the other by a very low
degree of trust, namely  = 1 and  = 0. In both countries the level of uncertainty, ,
is low. The tightness of the labour market in the country with low degree of trust is
given by:
c
q()
= 
y   u
¯
   D(b)
r +  + (1  )q()  
D(b)
Whereas the expression for the country with high degree of trust is:
c
q()
= 
y   u
¯
r +  + (1  )q()
, since there are no rms with bad reputation and therefore no deadweight loss.
What are now the e¤ects of a shock a¤ecting the level of uncertainty, ? Such a shock
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would only a¤ect the country with low degree of trust, since  a¤ects the deadweight
loss:
D(b)  (1  p)(1  ) 
r +  + 
This means that an increase in increases also the deadweight loss. If the di¤erence
between the high and the low productivity level is big, rms can gain more by lying, but,
if the match does not take place they also lose a greater share of the match surplus.
As mentioned before, only the country with a low degree of trust is a¤ected by the
deadweight loss. In this country a higher  leads to a higher D(b) and to the decrease
in the matching rate of the worker, q(), implying an increase in unemployment. In
this case, the same shock has di¤erent e¤ects on countries. The lower the degree of
trust, the larger is the e¤ect of a shock in the level of uncertainty.
The outcome of this model suggests di¤erences in  can explain the di¤erent levels
of unemployment across countries. The maximal di¤erence in unemployment between
countries with good and bad labour relations is 1,4%. This means that countries where
the level of trust is very low can have unemployment rates up to 1,4% higher than
countries with good labour relations. Even higher di¤erences are found if assuming
that ine¢ cient bargaining does not lead to a lower surplus, but to separation. In this
case di¤erences around 8% in the unemployment rate across countries can be explained.
Strikes and unemployment before the 1980s increased more in countries with bad
labour relations, supporting the results of this model. But the evolution since 1980s is
not well explained: unemployment increased steadily while strikes went back. In order
to explain this evolution, technology should be assumed as endogenous: If rms are
a¤ected by strikes and bargaining failures, they may switch to more capital intensive
technologies. In the 70s workers increased their bargaining power, which could have
encouraged rms to reduce the role of labour in their production. This would explain
the decline in labour share and the increase in unemployment in the 80s and 90s.
Alternatively, rms can choose to produce goods with a stable demand, where the
uncertainty is lower. With this approach the evolution of strikes and unemployment
since the 80s can be explained: The level of uncertainty, , increased in the 70s, for
example because of new technologies. As we saw earlier, this a¤ects only countries with
bad labour relations. In those countries unemployment and strikes increased. Firms
choose, as a reaction, to switch to a more certain technology, which led to a decrease
in strikes, while unemployment remained high.
3.3 Econometric Findings
In order to analyze the e¤ect of labour relations, I introduced an index measuring the
quality of labour relations. This index comes from the Global Competitiveness Report
and ranges from 0 to 7, where 0 implies very bad employer/employee relations while 7
means that labour relations are generally cooperative. The index exists for three years,
namely 1993, 1999 and 2003.
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Figure 5
Labour Relations in 1999 vs. Unemployment Rate in 2000
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As we can see in Figure 5, there exists a clear negative relation between labour
relations and the unemployment rate. Countries with lower unemployment rates tend to
have better labour relations. However, this is only a descriptive statistic, which cant tell
us anything about the causality. That is, we dont know yet why this relation exists, if
labour relations and not some other omitted variable is a¤ecting unemployment. Good
labour relations may be correlated with a good state of the economy, which in turn
a¤ects unemployment. In other words, if the country currently is in a cyclical upturn
the unemployment rate will be lower and on the other hand, also labour relation may
improve. Therefore the e¤ect of this cyclical upturn is measured through good labour
relations. To analyze this issue more in detail, we have to describe the unemployment
rate by not only labour relations but also by including other institutions which a¤ect
unemployment.
The following estimations will show if the theory of Blanchard and Philippon, saying
that bad labour relations can lead to higher unemployment rates, is supported by the
data. In a rst approach, depicted in Table 7, I estimated the unemployment rate in
2000 and 2003 in all 20 OECD countries of the sample by the labour relation in 1999
and institutional variables. The reason for estimating the unemployment rate both
in 2000 and 2003 is that the e¤ect of bad labour relations may a¤ect unemployment
only in the future and therefore bad labour relations in 1999 could eventually have an
impact on the unemployment rate in the following years. Labour relations turn out
to be signicant in explaining unemployment if entered individually (A) and (B), and
remain signicant if introducing other institutional variables estimation (B) and (C).
While the coe¢ cient of labour relations is signicant and negative, coe¢ cients of all
other variables are for both years insignicant. The results of those estimations are in
line with the ndings of Blanchard and Philippon. They also indicate that the degree
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of labour relations in 1999 has a greater impact on the unemployment rate in 2000 that
on the one in 2003.
Table 7
Unemployment in all OECD countries in 2000 and 2003
Estimated by Institutions and Labour Relations (OLS)
A) DV: Unemploym ent 2000 B) DV : Unemploym ent 2003 C) DV : Unemploym ent 2000 D) DV : Unemploym ent 2003
Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic)
Labour Relations 1999 -2 .35 (-3 .51) -1 .81 (-3 .74) -2 .09 (-2 .60) -1 .35 (-2 .23)
Aver. Rep lacem ent rate - - -0 .07 (-1 .13) -0 .047 (-1 .29)
PMR - - -0 .58 (-0 .59) 0.16 (0.22)
EPL - - 0 .58 (0.57) 0.56 (0.84)
Union Density - - 0 .04 (1.26) -0 .004 (-.017)
Tax Wedge - - -0 .03 (-0 .37) 0.103 (1.72)
Output Gap - - 0 .20 (-037) 0.097 (2.91)
Constant 18.49 (5.622) 15.97 (6.25) 18.99 (4.10) 11.17 (2.91)
R2 0.40 0.43 0.53 0.68
Observations 20 20 20 20
(The average replacement rate, tax wedge, PMR, EPL output gap in regressions
C are the measures for the year 2000 and in D for the year 2003.)
In order to check how robust those ndings are regarding to changes in the sample
size, I performed in Table 7a (see Appendix 1) estimations including only European
countries. The results for the two rst estimations with only labour relations as in-
dependent variable are mostly similar to the ones in Table 7. The only di¤erence is
that when estimating the unemployment rate in 2003 labour relations are insignicant.
suggesting that the results of this estimation are not robust to a change in the sample
size.
Table 8
Labour Relations in European Countries
Instrumented by Average Strike Days in the 60s (OLS)
Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic)
IV Labour Relations 1999 -2.69 (-2.95)
Constant 20.71 (4.44 )
R2 0.40
Observations 13
(Not included in estimation are Norway and Switzerland)
Another problem which arises in this estimation is endogeneity. Labour relations
can inuence future unemployment in the sense that separation rates increase caused
by the lack of trust towards rms, as we already saw in the model. On the other
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hand, if the unemployment rate is high, which suggests that the economic situation
may not be the best, labour relations tend to worsen. In other words, labour relations
can be inuenced by the unemployment rate which creates an endogeneity problem. In
order to correct for this, I instrumented the labour relations in 1999 by the average
strike days in the 60s. Like Blanchard and Philippon, I have chosen the strikes in
the 60s because those strikes took place before unemployment began to increase and
therefore could not have been a¤ected by this rise in unemployment. The strikes in the
60s are negatively correlated with labour relations today, which means that countries
with more strikes in the 60s have worse labour relations today. Blanchard used in his
paper an index measuring the days lost because of strikes and the number of workers
involved, allowing a more accurate measurement. In my regression, I use as instrument
the average strike days in the 60s, dened as "days lost by strikes". Because no data
for the 60s was available for Austria, Spain, Portugal and Finland I had to take the
average strike days in the 1970s. Norway and Switzerland had to be dropped, since
no data existed for this time period, which reduced the number of observations to 13
compared to 18 observations included in the regression of Blanchard. As we can see in
Table 8, if we instrument labour relations by the strike days, the coe¢ cient is negative
and signicant. It is also consistent with the results of column (A) in Table 7. The
F-test shows that the coe¢ cient of the instrumented variable is signicantly di¤erent
from zero (results not reported). The negative sign is as expected by the results of
the model, meaning that a higher degree of labour relations has positive e¤ects on the
unemployment rate.
Table 9
Unemployment Estimation including
Labour Relations (xed e¤ects)
Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic)
Labour Relations -1.08 (-2.42)
Replacement Rate 0.14 (8.20)
Tax Wedge 0.26 (10.95)
Ben. Duration -2.64 (-3.56)
EPL 0.14 (-0.41)
PMR 0.68 (3.30)
High Corporatism -1.31 (-3.85)
Output Gap -0.47 (-14.84)
R2 (within) 0.68
R2 0.92
Observations 434
In a last step I created a time series for labour relations. I had the labour relation
index for 3 years, namely 1993, 1999 and 2003. I used three time periods, the rst
1983 to 1993, the second 1994 to 1999 and the last 2000 to 2003. The value of the
index is xed in each period and equal to the index of 1993, 1999 and 2003. The other
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institutional variables are the same as in the previous regression. The results in Table 9
show that except for EPL all variables including labour relations are signicant. Because
I couldnt get data on strikes in non-European countries, I could not instrument labour
relations in this regression. This said, one cannot say much about the causality. There
seems to be a signicant and negative relation between the unemployment rate and the
degree of labour relations, but its not clear whether bad labour relations cause higher
unemployment. The average value of labour relations is 5.1, which is approximately
the level of Germany of Ireland. The results of this estimation suggest that an increase
in labour relations by 1.3 deviation points, namely from 5.1 to 6.4, all other institutions
at the mean value, would lead to a decrease in unemployment by 1.18%.
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Conclusion
We saw in the previous sections a few explanations for the evolution of unemploy-
ment. In a rst instance we analyzed the inuence of institutions and shocks on un-
employment in the long run. The three main shocks, namely a decline in TFP growth,
the changes in interest rates and the decline in labour share turn out to be signicant
in the estimations. In order to explain the di¤erences in unemployment rates across
countries we saw that institutions play an important role in the sense that they can
a¤ect the impact of a shock on the labour market, which can for example lead to more
permanent unemployment. The outcomes however are sometimes ambiguous. In the
case of EPL, the long run e¤ects on the unemployment rate are not clear, what is re-
ected by an insignicant coe¢ cient throughout all estimations. The same holds for
the union density, which has no clear e¤ect on its own but together with a high degree
of corporatism (or centralization) becomes signicant.
We then turned in Section 2 to another source of explanation, namely product
market regulation. The model presented in this section concludes that deregulation of
the goods market leads in the long run to higher real wages and less unemployment.
We also learn that the way this deregulation is performed plays an important role
regarding the impact on labour markets. We deduce from the model that a quick and
combined deregulation of labour and product markets, in order to prevent oppositions
of workers, would lead to the best outcome. If we look at the empirical side, the results
of the model can be supported. The coe¢ cient of product market regulation is in all
estimations positive and signicant.
In the last section we had a look on the labour relations between employers and
employees. This is the last approach in this paper to explain unemployment. We
learned that from the theoretical point of view, bad labour relations lead to higher
separation rates and therefore also to higher unemployment rates. In a country with
many rms having a bad reputation, the wages will be re-negotiated more often and
the probability of having the match ended increases. Another important conclusion
was also that if the economic environment is less predictable, more rms are attracted
by having a bad behavior. In a country with only rms having a good reputation, an
increase in uncertainty has nearly no e¤ect on the labour market since rms will always
tell the truth about their productivity.
These results can only be supported in part by the empirical estimations in this
paper. Good labour relations turn out to have a positive and signicant e¤ect on
unemployment in the 20 OECD countries of the sample. If however we take into
account only the European countries , the model does not a good job in explaining
the unemployment rate in 2003, suggesting that the results are not robust to changes
in the sample size. Furthermore labour relations are highly endogenous, since they can
be inuenced by the unemployment rate. This causality problem cannot be solved for
the estimation with all countries of the sample because of a lack of data. If estimating
the unemployment rate by xed e¤ects, using a time variable for labour relations, the
results are signicant but, as already said, the causality problem remains. The results
of this section are not as supportive as those in the previous ones, especially because
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of the causality problem it is di¢ cult to conclude on the e¤ect of labour relations.
41
References
[1] Bassanini, Andrea and Duval, Romain, "Employment Patterns in OECD Countries:
Reassessing The Role Of Policies And Institutions". OECD Economic Department
Working Paper No. 486, June 2006.
[2] Blanchard, Olivier, "European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts and Ideas".
MIT, Department Of Economics, October 2005.
[3] Blanchard, Olivier and Giavazzi, Francesco, "Macroeconomic E¤ects Of Regulation
And Deregulation In Goods And Labour Markets". The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, August 2003.
[4] Blanchard, Olivier and Wolfers, Justin, "The Role Of Shocks And Institutions In
The Rise Of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence". The Economic
Journal, Vol 110, No. 462, March 2000.
[5] Blanchard, Olivier and Philippon, Thomas (November 2006), "The Quality Of
Labour Relations and Unemployment".
[6] Nicoletti, Giuseppe and Scarpetta, Stefano, "Product Market Reforms And Em-
ployment In OECD Countries". Economic Department Working Papers No. 472,
December 2005.
[7] Nickell, Stephen, Nunziata, Luca and Ochel, Wolfgang, "Unemployment in the
OECD since the 1960s. What Do We Know?". The Economic Journal, 115, January
2005
[8] "OECD Employment Outlook 2004", Chapter 2: Employment Protection Regula-
tions and Labour Market Performance.
42
Appendix 1
2.2.3 Proof: Replace  by c=(1      c) in the real wage equation of the short run
general equilibrium:
Wi=P =
1 + 
h
c
1  c
i
1 +
h
c
1  c
i
Wi=P =
1     c+ c
1     c 
1     c
1  
Wi=P =
1     c+ c
1   =
(1  )  c(1  )
1  
Wi=P =1  c
3.1: Proof: Replace W (y; ) by the expression of the counter o¤er W c, namely
U + (1  )S(y; ), in the denition of the surplus S(y; ):
J(y; )  V + U + (1  )S(y; )  U =S(y; )
J(y; )  V + (1  )S(y; )=S(y; )
J(y; )=V + S(y; )
3.1.1: Proof: Assume the truth-telling constraint of the non-cooperative equilib-
rium holds as an equality:
S(yh; b) W h(yh; b)= (1  s) S(yh; b) W (yl; b)+ s (1  )S(yh; b) W (yl; b)
S(yh; b) W h(yh; b)= (1  s) S(yh; b) W (yl; b)+ s(1  )S(yh; b)  sW (yl; b)
S(yh; b) W h(yh; b)=S(yh; b) W (yl; b)  sS(yh; b) + sW (yl; b) + s(1  )S(yh; b)  sW (yl; b)
W (yl; b) W h(yh; b)= s (1  )S(yh; b) W (yl; b)  S(yh; b) +W (yl; b)
W (yl; b) W h(yh; b)= s (1  )S(yh; b)  S(yh; b)
W (yl; b) W h(yh; b)= s S(yh; b)(1     1)
s(b)=
W (yl; b) W h(yh; b)
S(yh; b)
s(b)=
U + (1  )S(yh; b)  U   (1  )S(yl; b)
S(yh; b)
s(b)=
(1  )

 S(y
h; b)  S(yl; b)
S(yh; b)
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3.1.3 Proof: Replace rU by u
¯
+ q()(1  )E( S())
E

S()

=
y   rU   (1  ) D(b)
r + 
E

S()

=
y   u
¯
  q()(1  )E  S()  (1  ) D(b)
r + 
(r + )E

S()

+ q()(1  )E  S()= y   u
¯
  (1  ) D(b)
E

S()

=
y   u
¯
  (1  ) D(b)
r +  + q()(1  )
3.1.3. Proof: Use rV =  c+ q() [E [Je()]  V ] = 0 and replace E [Je()] by
J() = V +  S()  D()
0= c+ q() E V +  S()  D()  V 
c= q()

E

 S()  D()
c
q()
= E

S()
  (1  ) D(b)
3.1.4. Proof: Replace S(g)  S(b) in the truth telling constraint of the cooperative
equilibrium by y r(U V )
r+
  y r(U V )  D(b)
r+
:
(1  ) S(yh; g)  S(yl; g) 
r +  + 

D(b) + 

y   r(U   V )
r + 
  y   r(U   V )  
D(b)
r + 

(1  ) S(yh; g)  S(yl; g) 
r +  + 
D(b)

1 +

r + 

 D(b)

1 +

r + 

 (1  ) S(yh; g)  S(yl; g) (r +  + )
 D(b)

1 +

r + 

 (1  )(r +  + )

S +
(1  p)
r +  + 
  S + p
r +  + 

 D(b)

1 +

r + 

 (1  )
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3.3.
Table 7a
Unemployment in European countries in 2000 and 2003
Estimated by Institutions and Labour Relations (OLS)
A) DV: Unemploym ent 2000 B) DV : Unemploym ent 2003 C) DV : Unemploym ent 2000 D) DV : Unemploym ent 2003
Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic) Coe¢ cient (t-Statistic)
Labour Relations 1999 -2 .75 (-3 .5) -2 .04 (-3 .62) -2 .55 (-2 .38) -0 .12 (-0 .97)
Aver. Rep lacem ent rate -0 .06 (-0 .67) -0 .01 (-.028)
PMR -0.78 (-0 .37) -.019 (-.055)
EPL 0.63 (0.37) -0 .21 (-0 .55)
Union Density 0.04 (0.99) 0.02 (1.53)
Tax Wedge -0 .09 (-.072) -0 .02 (-0 .74)
Output Gap -0.10 (-0 .09) -0 .37 (-1 .35)
Constant 20.83 (5.00) 17.40 24.09 (3.72) 6.72 (5.65)
R2 0.48 0.50 0.63 0.69
Observations 15 15 15 15
(The average replacement rate, tax wedge, PMR, EPL output gap in regressions
C are the measures for the year 2000 and in D for the year 2003.)
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Appendix 2
Abstract (German):
Diese Arbeit zielt darauf ab, den Verlauf der Arbeitslosenrate besser zu verstehen.
In der Vergangenheit haben sich schon viele Forscher mit diesem Thema auseinander
gesetzt und sind teilweise zu unterschiedlichen Erkenntnissen gekommen. Um einen
klaren Überblick über den Stand der Ergebnisse in diesem Bereich zu geben, werden in
der Arbeit einige Forschungspapiere vorgestellt und deren Ergebnisse diskutiert. Um
zu überprüfen, ob sich die Ergebnisse dieser theoretischen Ansätze in den Daten wider-
spiegeln, werden zu jedem Erklärungsansatz Regressionsanalysen präsentiert, welche
die Arbeitslosenrate anhand von ausgewählten Variablen schätzen.
Erstmals intensiv mit diesem Thema beschäftigt haben sich Wissenschaftler in den
60er Jahren, als die Arbeitslosenraten in den Europäischen Ländern zu steigen began-
nen. Der erste Ansatz, um diese Entwicklung zu erklären, war Veränderungen in der
Wirtschaft heranzuziehen. Diese Schocks betrafen zwar alle Länder, konnten aber nicht
die heterogene Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenraten erklären. Hier kommen die Arbeits-
marktinstitutionen ins Spiel: Jede Volkswirtschaft reagiert anders auf einen Schock.
Länder mit starren Lohnsetzungssystemen werden zum Beispiel mehr Schwierigkeiten
haben, sich an eine schlechtere Wirtschaftslage anzupassen, da es dort länger braucht,
um eine Änderung im Lohnniveau zu erreichen. Die Ergebnisse von Olivier Blanchard
und Justin Wolfers aus ihrem Papier The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise
of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence (2000) werden im ersten Teil
der Arbeit vorgestellt und diskutiert.
Veränderungen in Institutionen sowie Schocks liefern zwar gute Ergebnisse bei der
Schätzung der Arbeitslosenrate, was aber nicht bedeutet, dass diese nicht auch noch
von anderen Faktoren beeinusst wird. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird genauer auf
die Rolle der Marktregulierung eingegangen. Das Modell, das in diesem Teil vorgestellt
wird, kommt aus dem Papier Macroeconomic E¤ects of Regulation and Deregulation
in Goods and Labour Markets (2003), von Olivier Blanchard und Francesco Giavazzi.
Die Autoren kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Deregulierung des Gütermarktes die
spätere Deregulierung der Arbeitsmarktes erleichtert. Weiters schließen sie, dass eine
Deregulierung langfristig gesehen einen positiven Einuss auf die Arbeitslosenrate hat.
Der letzte Teil dieser Arbeit ist dem Verhältnis zwischen Arbeitgebern und Arbeit-
nehmern gewidmet. Olivier Blanchard und Thomas Philippon argumentieren in ihrem
Papier The Quality of Labour Relations and Unemployment (2006), dass Länder mit
schlechten Arbeitsverhältnissen dazu tendieren, höhere Arbeitslosenraten zu haben. Im
Modell der Autoren wird davon ausgegangen, dass Firmen ein "schlechtes" Verhalten
an den Tag legen können, was dazu führt, dass diese bei den Lohnverhandlungen über
ihre wahre Produktivität lügen, um einen niedrigeren Lohn für die Arbeiter rechtfer-
tigen zu können. Im Modell führt das zum Misstrauen der Arbeiter, einer höheren
Trennungsrate und schlussendlich zu einer höheren Arbeitslosenrate.
46
47
